F.A.M. Browning, C.B, D.S.O, Lieut. General
To: Lt. General Sir Ronald Weeks, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff
Sir,
I have the honour to bring the following facts to your notice with regard to Major-General
St. Sosabowski, Commander 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group during operation
"MARKET."
During the weeks previous to operation "MARKET," a period which entailed detailed planning for three other possible operations, the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group formed part of the force envisaged. Both during this period and, in fact, ever since the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group was mobilised in July, Major-General Sosabowski proved himself to be extremely difficult to work with. The "difficulty" was apparent not only to commanders under whom he was planning but also to staff officers of the other airborne formations concerned.
During this period he gave me the very distinct impression that he was raising objections and causing difficulties as he did not feel that his brigade was fully ready for battle. When the brigade was first mobilised I made it absolutely clear to this officer, and in no uncertain terms, that I was the sole judge of the efficiency of his brigade and it was merely his duty to get them ready and train them with all the determination of which he was capable.
It became apparent during this training period that, capable soldier as this officer undoubtedly is, he was unable to adapt himself to the level of a parachute brigade commander, which requires intimate and direct command of his battalions. He left too much to his Chief of Staff and attempted to treat his parachute brigade as if it were a much higher and bigger formation.
During operation "MARKET" the brigade was unfortunate in being dropped in parts owing to the weather. However, during this period of operation "MARKET" great difficulties were being overcome hourly by all formations of the Second Army in their efforts to reach the 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. This officer proved himself to be quite incapable of appreciating the urgent nature of the operation, and continually showed himself to be both argumentative and loathe to play his full part in the operation unless everything was done for him and his brigade.
Subsequently, when the 1st Airborne Division had been withdrawn, and the Polish Parachute Brigade Group reverted to my command South of the R. Waal, this officer worried both me and my staff (who were at that time fighting a very difficult battle to keep the corridor open from inclusive Nijmegen to Eindhoven) about such things as two or three lorries to supplement his transport. I was forced finally to be extremely curt to this officer, and ordered him to carry out his orders from then on without query or obstruction.
Both Commander 30 Corps and Commander 43 Division will bear out my criticism of the attitude of this officer throughout the operation. Major-General Sosabowski has undoubtedly, during the three years in which I have been connected with him, done a very great amount for the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade Group under disappointing circumstances. He was mainly responsible for the whole of the raising, organisation and training of the brigade. However, this good record cannot be allowed to interfere with the present and future efficiency of the brigade.
I am forced, therefore, to recommend that General Sosabowski be employed elsewhere, and that a younger, more flexibly minded and cooperative officer be made available to succeed him. There are, to my knowledge, two possible candidates now serving with the brigade. The first is Lieut-Col. S. Jachnik, who is at present Deputy Commander. This officer has had practically no opportunity to display his powers owing to the somewhat overbearing nature of General Sosabowski's personality. The appointment of this officer would, in my opinion, be essentially in the nature of an experiment. The second candidate is Major M. Tonn, who commands 1 Parachute Battalion. This officer has trained his battalion well and, in my opinion and in the opinion of the G.S.O.1. Liaison (Airborne) Lieut-Col. Stevens, he possesses the requisite drive and administrative ability to fulfill the appointment. However, this appointment must remain largely a matter for the Polish Army to make, and it will probably be better in the long run if new blood be brought in.
Finally, I wish to emphasise again that I consider
Major-General Sosabowski is a knowledgeable and efficient soldier and up to the average of
his rank, but owing to his outlook, temperament and inability to cooperate he should be
given a change of employment.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Sgd) F. A. M. Browning
Commander Airborne Corps.
